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Horton’s Odyssey
The Politics of School Finance Reform in Connecticut
Lesley DeNardis
Sacred Heart University

Abstract
School finance reform has been one of the most controversial and
contentious issues in public policy over the last thirty years. Public
schools have served as battlegrounds over fundamental questions
of equality, liberty, and access to social and economic opportunities.
Since the historic decision rendered by the California Supreme
Court in Serrano v. Priest (1971) equated public education with a
fundamental right, a wave of legal and legislative reforms swept
the nation including the state of Connecticut. Following the lead of
California, plaintiffs in the Horton v.Meskill (1977) case argued that
the Connecticut’s heavy reliance on the property tax to finance
public schools was unconstitutional. Finding in favor of the
plaintiffs, the Connecticut Supreme Court directed the General
Assembly to fashion a plan to equalize spending between school
districts. Thirty years and numerous attempts later, the goal of
school finance reform to equalize spending across school districts
has not produced the intended effects of reducing funding
disparities. In fact, some would argue that despite modest strides
in equalizing spending, the gap between rich and poor districts has
widened. To account for this apparent policy failure, tentative
explanations will entail a thorough examination of the key
institutional actors involved in educational policy making as well
as the following factors: political ideology, financial resource
constraints, legal complexity and the political economy of school
funding. By capturing the legal and legislative dynamics behind the
school finance reform movement, a more nuanced and
contextualized account emerges to explain the apparent failure of
this policy in Connecticut.
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Introduction
After the landmark school finance reform decision of Serrano v. Priest (1971) in
California declared the reliance on the property tax to fund public schools as
violating the principle of equal educational opportunity, Connecticut was among
several states that followed suit with the case of Horton v. Meskill (1977) in the socalled second wave of school finance litigation.1 The lawsuit filed in 1974 on
behalf of then 10 year old Barnaby Horton against the administration of
Governor Meskill, was the first to challenge the way Connecticut financed public
education. At that time, local property taxes in Connecticut provided
approximately seventy percent of the revenue to finance public schools. The
remaining thirty percent was derived from state and federal funds.

Such a

funding scheme, the plaintiffs argued, created wide spending disparities
between property-rich and property- poor towns. Similar to the reasoning in the
California ruling, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that the heavy reliance
on the property tax to fund public education violated the mandate to provide an
equal educational opportunity to all children.
In directing the state legislature to fashion a remedy, the Connecticut
Supreme Court set in motion a thirty year quest to equalize school funding
across Connecticut’s municipalities. Successive legislatures, while rhetorically
supporting reform, have failed to fully fund equalization schemes. After thirty
years of equalization efforts, the state still lags well behind the national average
of a fifty percent with approximately 40% of the share of public school funding
derived from state funds.2 Some studies argue that despite modest strides in

Legal scholars have divided school finance litigation history into three waves to
describe the differences in legal strategies employed by plaintiffs during each time
period. Second wave lawsuits challenged school finance systems through state
education clauses, state equal protection clauses or both. For a full discussion, see Roelke,
Green, and Zielewski (2004), 104-133.
2
This figure was derived from a report compiled by the Connecticut Conference
on Municipalities based on estimates for the Connecticut State Office of Fiscal Analysis.
1
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equalizing spending, the gap between rich and poor districts in Connecticut has
widened.3 Using the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of Horton v. Meskill,
this study traces the political history of school finance reform from the landmark
Horton case in 1977 to the Education Finance Commission of 2007. By capturing
the legal and legislative dynamics behind the school finance reform movement, a
more nuanced and contextualized account emerges to explain the apparent
failure of this policy in Connecticut.

Tentative explanations will entail a

thorough examination of the following factors: political ideology, state financial
resource constraints, legal complexity and the political economy of school
funding.
The Serrano case attracted a great deal of scholarly attention on the topic
of

school

finance

reform (Berke

1970,;Furhman 1979, Wise 1968).

1974;

Coons,

Clune and

Sugerman

Numerous national level studies have

examined the impact on court ordered school finance reform. However, few if
any detailed case studies have been conducted to analyze the specific trajectory
of the reforms in Connecticut. Where Connecticut has been included in multiple
case studies, it has often been given secondary or tertiary treatment (Reed 2001).
In addition to methodological issues, the foci of much of the scholarly research
that has been conducted to date in this area has revolved around the history of
litigation efforts in school finance published in legal, economic or public finance
journals. These studies have highlighted the various court cases filed nationwide
and their impact on school spending. For example, an oft-cited study by Evans,
Murray and Schwab (1997) examined the time period from 1972-1992 to assess
the impact of court reform on the states. They found a differential impact of
spending across the states. Again, the reasons for the differential in spending
For a full discussion see K-12 Public Education: The State of the State and Local
Partnership CCM Public Policy Report CCM January 2009
3
One longitudinal study of Connecticut’s school finance equalization plan found
that after the first six years, inequalities were worse than at the time of the court’s
decision. For a full discussion, see Reed (2001).
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have not been fully delineated. Such cross national studies that assess the impact
of court cases in the aggregate have not dwelled on the specific trajectory of
change that occurred in Connecticut. Moreover, these studies by aggregating
results either overstate or understate the success or failure of reform efforts.
Such comparative studies, while important for achieving a general
understanding of school finance reform, do little to shed light on the reasons for
the trajectory of reform in individual states including Connecticut. In pointing
out the shortcomings of national level studies Michael A. Rebell (2002, 7) cites the
need for case studies to provide answers to questions about the success or failure
of reform efforts.
The tremendous diversity in facts, legal rights and
requirements, political context, and specific holdings of courts in
various states makes it impossible to draw meaningful conclusions
from national-level studies on the impact of fiscal equity litigation.
This study proposes to fill such a vacuum through an examination of key
political and legal actors in Connecticut to permit a better understanding of the
underlying dynamics of school finance reform during its inception in the 1970s
when legislators took the court’s decision and crafted the first equalization plan.
Key turning points in the legal and political history will be highlighted with
special attention being given to the inception of school finance reform in the
1970s and early 1980s during the passage of the first equalization legislation in
1975, the legislative reform of 1979 in the aftermath of Horton v. Meskill (1977), the
adoption of the Education Cost Sharing Grant (ECS) in the aftermath of Horton v.
Meskill III (1985), and finally the seventh state commission to study school
finance reform in 2007.
Finally, this study analyzes the role that major institutional actors namely
the courts, the legislature, the executive branch, as well as municipalities have
played in order to provide a comprehensive explanation for the failure of school
finance reform. The failure is likely the product of a dynamic interplay of all of
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these institutions in policy formulation and implementation with each
contributing its share to the policy stalemate.
Role of the Courts in School Finance Reform
The role of the courts in policy making in the area of school finance has
been thoroughly examined in numerous national level studies. The foci of these
inquiries has been on the dynamics of judicial decision making, the specific
holdings in each of the cases, and finally, the impact of court ordered reforms on
equalization plans. Scholarship on the role of courts in the area of school finance
reform has been divided between those that portray the judicial branch as having
a catalytic effect on legislatures (Bosworth 2001) and those that portray it as
having a negligible effect on reform (Rosenberg 2008). Dinan (1996) found that
courts can be effective when certain conditions are met such as when the general
public and at least one political branch support the goals of the decision and
when the court gives the legislature flexibility in crafting a remedy.
Embedded in such debates about the efficacy of courts on school finance
are questions about the appropriate role of the judicial branch in policy making.
The mixed results from national level studies reflect the sensitivity that some
courts have displayed toward charges of judicial activism. Among the many
lessons from the desegregation battles after Brown, the judicial branch learned
that course decisions by themselves are not a wholly adequate response to given
social problems. The Connecticut Supreme Court reflects this concern as it
recognized its duty to interpret the law and stayed its hand in ordering a specific
remedy for school finance. It declining to prescribe a remedy for school finance
reform, it called upon the legislature to devise an equalization plan.
Given the prevailing legal trends nationwide for far reaching reforms
among jurists after Serrano, the Connecticut Supreme Court’s restraint is
understandable in light of two factors. One factor is the omnipresent political
consideration in Connecticut of a political culture steeped in strong traditions of
local control. In fact, when directing the General Assembly to fashion a plan to
241

New England Journal of Political Science

equalize spending in Horton v. Meskill (1977) the court case specifically states that
an equalization plan would not require towns to spend the same amount on
education. The second factor relates to timing of the case which emerged during
the second wave of litigation late 1970s. As Roelke et al (2004) observed in their
national study of legal trends, second-wave courts were not prescriptive in their
mandates out of deference to the legislative branch.

In Horton (1977), the

majority decision references the consideration to both local control and judicial
restraint by leaving the matter to political bodies to devise “ultimate solutions”4.
Later, in the context of Horton (III) the court continued this approach by trodding
a middle ground in devising a three-part test making it more difficult for
plaintiffs to demonstrate inequities while at the same time prompting the state
legislature to return to the drawing board in devising a new equalization plan.
Role of the Connecticut State Legislature in School Finance Reform
While some accounts of school finance litigation place the Courts at center
stage attributing failure or success to the jurisprudence of school finance reform,
an equally, if not more compelling institution in assessing the impact of school
finance reform, is the state legislature. Legislative bodies play a key role in the
appropriation of state funds for education. In examining the role that legislators
play with respect to the state budget, with the myriad incentives or disincentives
for policy reform, it is clear that school finance places legislators in a precarious
position. On the one hand, they are seldom in favor of proposing new spending
initiatives for fear of electoral backlash. On the other hand, openly opposing
school finance and equal opportunity would be an untenable position given the
discourse on social justice that has firmly taken root in American society. On the
other hand, as one Connecticut state legislator more colorfully summarized the
dilemma: voting against school finance reform would be akin to “voting against
The majority decision in this decision stated that the legislature is the appropriate
body to devise “ultimate solutions. The case is also noteworthy for declining to make
school finances a federally justiciable matter. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
4
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motherhood.”5 Thus, most Connecticut state legislators have had to navigate a
middle ground, one on which they enact modest and incremental reforms to pass
muster with the courts while not arousing the ire of key constituencies, namely
taxpayers.
The Connecticut State Legislature has been particularly adept at such
symbolic gestures which give the outward appearance of complying with court
directives while in actuality rolling back many key spending provisions through
delays, phased-in spending plans, and numerous amendments to cap spending
which have had the effect, intended or otherwise, of blunting the impact of court
decisions. While initially taking a proactive stance in spurring an equalization
plan in 1975 before the courts ordered it to do so, the legislative response ever
since that time has been slower and the reforms more modest in comparison to
many other states that were faced with similar circumstances in adopting school
aid formulas that attempt to equalize spending across school districts.
A second question relates to the equalization plan that the legislature
devised during this time period to comply with the Court’s decision in 1977.
While revising the existing grant system that awarded a flat grant of $250 per
pupil regardless of a town’s need, the legislature choose a Guaranteed Tax Base
approach.

The GTB is designed to reward equal local tax effort with equal

revenues from state and local sources. In his discussion of the types of reforms
enacted by state legislatures in school finance, Odden (1982) noted that reforms
fell into three categories: Guaranteed Tax Base [GTB], foundational grant, and
GTB with a foundation model. The latter was considered to be more effective in

During the final House debate on May 17, 1975 to enact the state’s first
guaranteed tax base plan Representative Nevas who represented Westport, CT(136 th
General Assembly District) articulated his perspective on the dilemma he faced in
opposing funding equalization in schools. While stating his objections to the bill he
noted that his district would not gain any additional funds from the plan. Nevas would
later become a federal judge.
5
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meeting equity standards by adjusting for local contribution.6 These reforms can
be placed along a spectrum with the GTB as the more conservative option and
the foundation model as entailing a greater state contribution. While Connecticut
eventually moved to a foundation plan in the form of the ECS, it largely was
prompted to do so by the court after Horton III (1985).
The perennial reworking of school aid formulas by the legislature for over
thirty years has prompted the plaintiffs to continue their legal challenges
suggesting that the rate and pace of reforms were not satisfactory. During the
early 1980s, the legislature undercut the GTB by passing amendments to limit
and cap spending. Wesley Horton returned to the courtroom and argued
successfully that the legislature was eroding the intent of the legislation and the
intent of Horton (I). In the subsequent decision known as Horton v. Meskill (III) in
1985, the legislature moved to a foundational model otherwise known as the
educational cost sharing or ECS as it is commonly referred to today.

The

judicial and legislative branches in Connecticut had been locked in this back and
forth pattern in which the court issues a mandate, the legislature minimally
complies, the plaintiffs return to court, and so on. The latest in this judiciallegislative saga is a case brought by the Connecticut Coalition for Justice in
Education Funding in 2005 against the administration of Governor Rell. The
State Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the spring of 2008 for which a
decision is still pending.
Role of the Chief Executive in School Finance Reform
Though the court in Horton (I and III) placed the onus on the legislature to
craft a school equalization plan, the importance of the chief executive cannot be
ignored. The slower rate and pace of school reform in Connecticut is due in part
to executive leadership. Governors are in a unique position through policy
For example, a foundation of $7,000 per pupil could lead to a state distribution of
$5,000 per pupil in a poor district and a state distribution of $2,000 in a rich district. The
poor district would contribute $2,000 while the rich district would contribute $5,000 per
pupil.
6
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proposals and the bully pulpit to champion reform efforts. Conversely, they are
also capable of benign neglect. This study will examine the role that successive
governors have played in the school finance debate.

Chief executives, during

the inception of the first equalization plans and throughout most of the time
period examined in this study, were not especially receptive to reforms. In fact,
successive governors have been named as defendants in school finance litigation
and have attempted to fend off litigation by defending the status quo.
The reasons for gubernatorial inaction stem in part from the role of chief
executives as guardians of the budget. Political ideology appears to have played
a more secondary role. Many of these patterns of executive action or inaction are
predictable given the role of governors as having central responsibility for the
formulation and execution of the state budget. Having to navigate among the
competing spending priorities and other fiscal constraints, most governors are
reluctant to propose

any

new

spending

initiatives,

especially during

economically difficult times. In a retrospective look at Connecticut, key school
finance reform court decisions and legislation dovetailed with economic
recessions and budget deficits. Governor Meskill, the defendant in the first
Horton case, dealt with a recession in the early 1970s during which time he took
the unpopular decision to raise certain taxes and cut services. In speaking before
the General Assembly in February 1971, Meskill delivered a grim budget
message that was repeated by his successor Ella Grasso in February, 1975 in what
became known as “the cupboard is bare” speech:
The cupboard, to be sure, is very bare. The document before
you tonight is in every sense of the word an austerity budget. The
budget message is also a sad legacy of bad budgeting, of unrealistic
figures and of deficit. The failure to face these problems squarely
has resulted in a budget for this fiscal year that leaves the state in a
deteriorating fiscal position (Keating 2009).
Economic recessions continued to mark the early 1980s and the early
1990s constraining gubernatorial action in the area of school finance reform.
245
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During the mid-80s, there was a brief period of economic recovery during which
time the legislature appropriated more funds for school aid. However, it was not
until the State of Connecticut was in the fortuitous position of a budget surplus
that a dramatic policy proposal was championed by Governor Rell during the
2007 session of the General Assembly. The Governor proposed to spend 3.4
billion in additional state aid over five years to assist municipalities in meeting
educational costs (Editor 2007). Such a plan would enable Connecticut to finally
achieve a 50/50 cost sharing ratio between the state and school districts. The
plan was ultimately defeated by a Democratic majority in the General Assembly
that chose to fund other spending priorities.
Role of Municipalities in School Finance Reform
Another dimension of the school finance dilemma concerns the
countervailing influence of municipalities as well the competing priorities
embodied by the various interest groups operative at the local level.

In

Connecticut, the politics of school finance reform invariably pits the propertyrich towns against the property- poor towns whose goals in devising school aid
formulas differ sharply (Pennington 2006). The former seek to utilize school aid
to bolster their school budgets and as a mechanism to provide property tax relief.
The latter would prefer to use school aid to relieve municipal overburden. These
dichotomous views factored into the legislative debates of 1975 and 1978 as
various school aid formulas were being devised. Compounding the problem,
neither municipal chief executives nor school superintendents view their share of
equalization funds grant as sufficient due to rising school costs and inflationary
effects. Chief among their concerns is the inadequacy of funds to meet their
school budgetary needs. Particularly strong advocates of greater funding have
been the suburban municipalities who have seen their share of the ECS funds
dwindle over the years while urban centers receive the lion’s share due to the
legislature’s reworking of the school aid formula which gives greater weight to
income and other urban factors. As one legislator remarked, “school aid money
246
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was the only new revenue game in town” (DeNardis, Lesley 2008). This was not
lost on urban legislators who sought greater shares of the funds in this new
revenue game.
One of the factors contributing to the policy stalemate in Connecticut
stems from the political economy of school funding equalization plans. School
finance equalization schemes are redistributive in nature and necessarily
engender intense conflicts (Mintrom 1993). In the school finance debate, these
have chiefly been between rich and poor districts, as well as reflecting the divide
of rural, suburban and urban districts (Wise 1969). The General Assembly is the
legislative arena where these conflicts have played out.

Legislators, as

representatives of local districts, have had to be cognizant of electoral majorities
in crafting a remedy to school finance reform. A fuller explanation for policy
failure may lie in the incentives faced by legislators, taxpayers and parents of
school students.

In so doing, they have been sensitive to local taxpayers’

concerns. Municipalities have undoubtedly served to constrain the actions of
state

legislators

particularly

in

suburban

municipalities

overwhelmingly represented in the Connecticut General Assembly.
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Table 1: Timeline of Key Events in Connecticut School Finance History
Date

Event

1973

First

Significance

Commission

School

Finance

Educational

to

Study

Recommendations provided the basis for the first

and

Equal

equalization plan in Connecticut

Opportunity

appointed

by

Connecticut

General Assembly
1974

Superior Court Ruling in Horton

Ruled

Connecticut’

v. Meskill (I)

unconstitutional,

school

Meskill

finance

system

administration

as

appeals

decision to the State Supreme Court
1975

Guaranteed

Tax

Base

School finance

Legislation passed
1977

State Supreme Court decision

State Supreme Court upholds Superior Court’s ruling

on Horton v. Meskill (II)
1978

Second Commission on School
Finance Reform convenes to
comply with court decision

1979

A Plan for Promoting Equal
Educational

Opportunity

in

Connecticut
1979

HB

passed

by

General

Assembly

Public Act 79-128 modifies the Guarantee Tax Base plan
to include a minimum expenditure requirement

1980

Horton returns to court

1984

Superior Court Spada issues

State ordered to spend more money on schools

ruling
Governor O’Neill appealed the decision
1985

Horton v. Meskill (III)

Court affirmed the constitutionality of the GTB formula
and ruled that plaintiffs must pass a three-pronged test
Legislature begins work on a new school finance plan

1988

State

legislature

passed

the

“foundation model”
1989

2005

State

legislature

passed

the

Replaces the Guaranteed Tax Base plan with a new

Education Cost Sharing Plan

formula

CCJEF v. Rell

Challenged the level of funding in Connecticut as
inadequate

2007

Seventh

Commission

on

Education Finance

Issued

key

recommendations

to

Governor

Rell

including a 50-50 state-local school cost sharing plan
and accountability measures for school districts in

248

Volume IV, Number 2

“Brown By Other Means”: Serrano, Horton, and the School Finance Litigation
Movement in Connecticut
Horton v. Meskill (1977) emerged amidst the backdrop of a civil rights
movement that was entering a second and more mature phase marked by
redressing economic inequities in every corner of American life. The 1960s-70s
was a period that was marked by feverish activity and policy innovation
unleashed by Brown v. Board of Education (1954). The landmark Supreme Court
decision declared “separate but equal” to be unconstitutional and called for
schools to begin desegregation with “all deliberate speed”.

Buoyed by this

victory, the Brown decision propelled the civil rights movement forward and
ushered in a period of intense public policy activity.

Civil rights reformers

examined virtually every corner of American life in an effort to remedy past
discrimination in the areas of voting rights, fair housing, public schools, and
employment among others.
In revisiting the Brown decisions nearly two decades later, many of the
hoped for results in pursuing equal educational opportunity had not been fully
achieved. There was a sense of disappointment among those who were active in
the civil rights movement that the legacy of Brown had lost momentum (Eaton
2004). While de jure segregation had largely been defeated, de facto segregation
persisted due to residential housing patterns. Two decades after the Brown
decision, there was a growing realization that despite desegregation policies,
inequalities still persisted in many public schools across the United States owing
to a concentration of poor minorities in urban centers. Reformers set their sights
on the financing of education as another avenue to remedy inequities.
In his book Courts as Catalysts, Matthew Bosworth referred to the ensuing
litigation over school finance as “a continuation of Brown by other means”
(Bosworth 2001, 11).

This sentiment was echoed by the Connecticut State

Department of Education in 1976. The report reflects the conventional wisdom of the
time that equalizing aid to towns will have an impact on equal educational
opportunities.
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In the past generation, a second edge of that cutting sword
of equality has emerged with real force. Its fundamental thrust is
money: how it is to be most fairly generated in support of public
education, and how it is to be distributed so that equal resources
support the education of each child (Anonymous 1976, 1).
School finance reform became the second front to wage the battle against
inequality. The landmark decision that ushered in school finance litigation in
virtually every state was Serrano v. Priest (1971). Acknowledging that there mere
removal of legal barriers to education such as ending desegregation would not
accomplish the hoped for effects of equalizing educational opportunity, a second
prong in the legal strategy would challenge the constitutionality of school
funding systems at the state level. The policy impetus found its intellectual
parentage in the seminal work in a book on school finance reform by Coons,
Clune and Sugerman (1970) entitled Private Wealth and Public Education.

Coons

et al. summarized the relevant legal issues first raising the specter of litigation
with the contention that funding disparities violate the 14th amendment equal
protection clause. Reliance on the property tax resulted in wide variation in
spending between districts making equality of educational opportunity largely
dependent on where one lived.

Equal protection of the laws in terms of

educational opportunity, they argued was violated by such a funding scheme.
The lead counsel for the plaintiffs in Serrano v. Priest (1971), not
surprisingly, was John Coons. After mounting a vigorous argument showing the
stark spending disparities between wealthy districts such as Beverly Hills and
Baldwin Park, the latter being home to a largely low-income Hispanic population,
the court ruled that significant disparities between districts in terms of spending
due to an uneven distribution of taxable wealth violated the equal protection
clause of the state constitution. Moreover, the Serrano court held that property
wealth should not play a role in the amount of money available for education
declaring that all children are guaranteed a right to public education regardless

250

Volume IV, Number 2

of where they lived. The Serrano case created widespread interest whose impact
was far reaching.
Serrano provided a blueprint for continued litigation by its
success on state level fundamentality and equal protection claims,
and it showed that state constitutions might be vulnerable in ways
unavailable at the federal level. (Thompson, Wood and Crampton,
60).
Serrano became to school finance reform what Brown was to the civil rights
movement, both a rallying cry and a blueprint for action for school finance
reformers.

In fact, the Serrano decision cited Brown in its decision stating

unequivocally that education was the most important service provided by state
and local government. The next year eleven states reformed their school finance
systems as the result of court decisions. The Serrano court articulated a standard
referred to as fiscal neutrality which held that property wealth should not play a
role in the amount of money available for education.

The fiscal neutrality

standard would later be utilized by school reformers in Connecticut in devising
the Guaranteed Tax Base formula.
Legal entrepreneurs detected a fertile landscape to test their theories in the
arena of school finance reform. John Coons, the “Father of Fiscal Neutrality” and
lead Counsel on the Serrano case, captured the prevailing political and legal
climate when he addressed a group of Connecticut policymakers in 1978:
In the late 1960s, I suppose inflamed by the hope of the
Warren Court, lawyers around the country decided it would be a
good thing to apply some of the doctrines relating to poverty that
were emerging from the Supreme Court to education (Coons 1978).
One such legal entrepreneur was a freshly minted, Harvard trained lawyer,
Wesley Horton, who later went on to achieve prominence arguing the now
famous Horton v Meskill (1977, 1985) cases, the Sheff desegregation case (1996),
and the eminent domain case Kelo v. New London (2005). Having just completed a
clerkship under Connecticut Supreme Court Justice House in the late 1960s, he
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came away from that experience “with the conviction that the Connecticut
Supreme Court was a grossly underused resource” (Horton 1991). He quickly
set his sights on school funding informed from the unique vantage point of a
father whose son was enrolled in the Canton school system, a rural town outside
of Hartford.
Horton also happened to be a member of Canton’s School Board. Dealing
with the complexities of school finance from the ground up, he discovered in the
course of his duties that Connecticut used a flat grant of $250 per town as the
only method of equalizing spending across school districts (Eaton 2004). Horton
would argue that Canton as a property poor rural district was unable to garner
sufficient revenues through the property tax to provide an adequate education.
An examination of the facts led Horton to the conclusion that the
Constitution State was particularly susceptible to litigation. At the time that
Horton v. Meskill was filed in Superior Court in 1973, Connecticut ranked fiftieth
in terms of equalization measures and was one of only five states which utilized
a flat grant system which was considered to be the most conservative and least
equalizing method of providing state support to public schools, points Horton
raised during the trial. In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court stated that of
all the ways that states throughout the country distribute state funds, “the flat
grant has the least equalizing effect on local financial abilities” (376 A.2d 359 (Ct.
1977), at 369). Representative of the prevailing mood and belief in positive
government, Horton v. Meskill (1977) was the first test case to challenge school
funding in Connecticut.
Horton pointed out that the school financing system violated Article I of
the Connecticut State Constitution’s equal protection clause and Article VIII
which provided for free public elementary and secondary schools in the state.
Armed with social scientific studies and quantitative data, the plaintiffs
successfully made the case that Connecticut’s method of financing public
education, primarily through the property tax, violated the state constitution.
252
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The court’s decision included a comparative analysis of several Connecticut
towns to demonstrate the disparities in tax effort and the sharp differential that
the tax effort of different towns could yield for school expenditures. The highest
per pupil operating expenses were for Darien at $1570.47 while Canton’s was
$945 yet Canton had to levy a higher mill rate. 7 “Levelling” up to the Darien
standard would animate policy reformers in subsequent years. In upholding the
Superior Court’s ruling, Horton’s mentor, Justice House spoke for the majority
and agreed with the plaintiffs that the linking of the quality of a child’s education
to the property wealth of his or her community was:
Sheer irrationality as of the state’s system of financing
education in the state on the basis of property values would be
similar and no less tenable should the state make educational
expenditures dependent upon some other irrelevant factor such as
the number of telephone poles in the district (376 A.2d 359 (Ct. 1977)
at 373).
In a 4-1 decision, the court ruled that the school finance plan was
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the education rights clause and
the equal protection clause of the Connecticut state constitution.8 Moreover, it
also concluded that education was a fundamental right under the state’s
constitution’s equal protection provision by virtue of the degree of support given
to education by the legislature through the state’s history (376 A 2d 359 (Ct. 1977)
quoting Anonymous (1972), 1303, 1307). In a blow to local control proponents,
the court did not consider it to be a “compelling state interest” an oft cited

In the Court’s decision, the disparities were noted: “taxpayers in property-poor
towns such as Canton pay higher tax rates for education than taxpayers in property-rich
towns. The higher tax rates generate tax revenues in comparatively small amounts and
property-poor towns cannot afford the education of their pupils, on a per pupil basis,
the same amounts that property-rich towns do,” 376 A.2d 359 (Ct. 1977), at 368.
8
The Connecticut Constitution was rewritten in 1965 to include a constitutional
right to a free public education. Until that time, Connecticut was the only state without
a constitutional guarantee to a public education. For a full discussion of the
constitutional history see Collier (2008).
7
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argument to justify differential treatment for education among districts. The
decision mirrored much of the logic and reasoning of the Serrano case.
Voices of Dissent: Elite and Mass Opinion Toward School Finance
Equalization In the Wake of Horton v. Meskill (1977)
Justice Loiselle “The Lone Dissenter on the Connecticut State Supreme Court”
The nearly unanimous Horton decision belied the undercurrent of
dissenting voices both within the legal community and among various opinion
makers who expressed their reservations about the decision. In the dissenting
opinion,

Judge

Loiselle

disagreed

with

the

majority

regarding

the

fundamentality of the right to education in Connecticut.
No one argues that the state’s financial system causes an
absolute denial of educational opportunities to any child or that
education received in elementary or secondary schools is not free,
as mandated by the state constitution. After you’ve brushed the
foam off the beer, the plaintiff’s argument concerns only one item–money (376 A.2d 359 (Ct. 1977) at 378).
Justice Loiselle further stated his objections referencing the famous the Coleman
Report which cast doubt on the linkage between expenditures and student
performance (Coleman 1966).
I am not persuaded that expenditures for educational
opportunities above the reasonable minimum mandated by the
legislature have any substantial effect on the education of students
over the long pull. The Coleman Report suggests that any such
thesis is open to serious question. Although the trial court did no
make an express finding, it recognized in its memorandum that
there is a serious lessening marginal utility for each successive
increment of educational input (376 A.2d 359 (Ct. 1977), at 379).
Echoes of Justice Loiselle’s doubting comments could be heard from different
quarters in the legal community and in the legislative debates and public
hearings that transpired in the Connecticut General Assembly during the spring
of 1975 and 1979.
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The Legal Community and School Finance Reform
Voices of dissent continue to inform some of the school finance reform
debates and doubts about the feasibility of finance equalization plans to remedy
inequities between school districts.

A widely cited article that appeared in the

Yale Law Journal in 1973, openly questions the underlying rationale of the
Serrano decision (Churgin, Ehrenberg, and Grossi, Jr. 1972). Among the criticisms,
the authors of the article argued that the decision itself rested on three faulty
premises: 1) the individual wealth of the residents of a school district is directly
related to the assessed value of the property in that district, 2) assessed property
value is directly related to local expenditure levels and 3) local expenditure levels
are directly related to the quality of education. The second and third premises
resonated with fiscal conservatives who held that municipalities that were
fiscally conservative and prudent in their expenditures could be good stewards
of the resources while still providing a quality education.
Public Opinion Towards School Finance Reform in Connecticut
Discerning public opinion towards school finance equalization is a
difficult task. Formal public opinion polls have been scant and respondents can
seldom be reliably accounted for given the sensitive nature of the subject.
Perhaps the most candid responses towards school finance reform can be found
in the early days in the wake of the Horton decision when the subject was fresh
in the minds of many citizens and before any remedies had been devised. As the
legislature devised its court-ordered school finance equalization plan in the
spring of 1979, numerous public hearings which shed led on a segment of public
opinion and the various education interest groups representing an array of
teachers and parents. As Christopher Collier (2008, 604) recounts in vivid detail:
“Angry citizens went so far as to assert that the education article should never
have been added to the constitution, and that the proper response for the
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legislature would have been to find some constitutional means to set aside the
court decision.”9
The thrust of the Serrano decision and its progeny which centered on the
notion of equality of opportunity collided directly with another deeply held
American value, local control. Twin pillars of American political culture and at
times incompatible, liberty and equality have occupied a central place in the U.S.
pantheon of politics and policies. American education policy is caught in the
crosscurrents of these two competing ideas.

Public opinion polls reveal the

ambivalence towards education which vacillates between the belief in equality
on the one hand versus local control on the on the other hand. Americans
routinely express strong beliefs regarding the notion of equality in abstract terms.
This abstract value often conflicts with other values such as liberty.
Local control is another cherished value among Americans that has deep
roots dating back to colonial times. At its core, local control can be construed as
fundamentally a question of liberty or freedom.

The ideological questions

underlying school finance reform bring into play two incompatible strains in
American political thought that have competed for primacy in state educational
policy: In Connecticut, the tendency towards local control is especially
pronounced, Reed’s (2001) study of public opinion in Connecticut found that
among the explanatory factors regarding opposition to school finance reform,
local control proved to be the most salient in determining the degree of public
support or opposition to school finance reform in Connecticut.
Attitudes towards equality in public school funding involve
a complex mix of ideology and attitudes towards school
governance that transcends a battle of haves versus have nots.
Indeed, in Connecticut the strongest contributor to opposition to

The education clause was added to the Connecticut State Constitution as the
result of the Constitutional Convention of 1965.
9
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funding schools equally stemmed from fears of a loss of local
control.10
School finance reform entails fundamental questions about equality which
stated in abstract terms draw support from most Americans.

Yet when

confronted with specific choices among public policies which entail trade-offs
between competing spending priorities, they generally oppose the tax increases
necessary to support school finance reform. Such contradictory and competing
ideas found in public opinion find their expression in legislative behavior. State
legislators, undoubtedly aware of their constituents mixed views, have had to
navigate this difficult terrain to craft equalization plans.
Policy Entrepreneurs and School Finance Reform in Connecticut
Months before Wesley Horton entered Superior Court, a contingent of
lawmakers from Connecticut (including State Representatives DeNardis,
Klebanoff, and Truex) attended a seminar in Texas sponsored by the Education
Commission of the States in the summer of 1973 where the Serrano decision was
widely discussed. The consensus at the conference was that more school finance
litigation would soon follow in other states. Upon their return home, the
legislators quickly began to work on a new school finance plan in the hopes of
preempting the impending court action (DeNardis 2008). “The Commission to
Study School Finance and Equal Educational Opportunity” was established by
the Republican controlled 1973 General Assembly and was comprised of

Reed’s study drew from two public opinion surveys conducted by the University
of Connecticut’s Roper Center during the spring of 1979. The wording of the first survey
was “Some people feel that the same amount ought to be spent for the public schools
throughout Connecticut. Others think that the citizens of each town should be able to
decide how much they want to spend on education. Which do you think is more
important, 1) to fund schools equally, or 2) to let towns decide how much to spend on
their schools? In a follow up poll, the wording of the questions changed substantially to
read: “Some people say that the state should see to it that rich communities and poor
communities have the same amount of money per student to spend on their schools. In
general, do you favor this or oppose it?” In the second poll, 74% responded in favor of
equality up from 45% in the previous poll. For a full discussion see Reed (2001).
10
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fourteen legislators, the commissioners of education and finance, and eleven
interest groups. After a year and a half long study, a plan was unveiled to the
legislature during the 1975 session of the Connecticut General Assembly. As one
lawmaker succinctly summarized it, the legislature “had a rare opportunity to
get a jump on a developing major public problem to prevent the usual
government by crisis decision making” (Opinion Article 1979). The impetus for
reform came from a few members of the Connecticut state legislature, both
Democrats and Republicans who championed and propelled forward the school
finance reform agenda. Their viewpoints and experience prevailed in the design
of the first equalization plan.
In crafting their proposals, the Commission turned to a national network
of school finance activists, policy professionals, and academics that had begun to
take shape after the legal battles surrounding Brown. The “reform movement
could share information about developments in each state and use data to
persuade recalcitrant state legislatures of the funding problems”. (Ladd, Chalk
and Hansen 1999)

Serving as “ground zero” in the policy arena was the

Teacher’s College at Columbia University led by researcher, Donna Shalala, who
later went on to become Health and Human Services Secretary under President
Clinton. Shalala, a young and rising academic star, was primarily responsible for
generating data that the Commission would use to undergird its proposals.
Policy Options Pre-Horton I
The existing system to finance schools in Connecticut was heavily reliant
upon the property tax. The only equalization measure at that time was a perpupil flat grant of $250 that was distributed to all municipalities regardless of
local need or ability to pay. Connecticut lagged the nation in terms of
equalization measures. All of these facts weighed on the mind of the commission
members as they grappled with how to reform Connecticut’s lopsided school
funding system.

258

Volume IV, Number 2

On the one hand were deeply concerned with designing a school aid plan
that would pass muster with a looming court threat. On the other hand, they
were acutely aware of the economic and financial realities of the state. As astute
observers of the political realities and gauging what would be politically
acceptable to their legislative colleagues they examined several different school
aid programs including the Foundation Plan, Percentage Equalizing Plan and
Full State Funding (Connecticut State Department of Education 1976). However,
only two were given serious consideration and those were largely centered on
tax equalization.

Full funding schemes or “robin hood” approaches that

recaptured funds from wealthier towns to redistribute to poorer towns would
not be politically acceptable. Neither would be complete centralization of school
funding at the state level as the state of Hawaii and a few other states had
chosen utilize.
School Funding Formulas
Embedded in the design of school aid plans are underlying philosophical
beliefs about the role and purpose of government. Funding formulas vary across
the U.S. but the main variants can be classified as flat grants, equalization grants,
multitier grants, and full state funding grants. The Commission to Study School
Finance examined all the plans in use at the time but seriously only considered
the two which were deemed to be congruent with Connecticut’s political culture.
In fact, the Commission’s report references the fact that the decision to utilize the
GTB was based on Connecticut’s strong tradition of local control. In explaining
its rationale for the adoption of the GTB, the Commission report stated that:
We reviewed all the major methods which can be used to
finance current operating expenditures. The other alternatives
(foundation program, percentage equalizing grant, full state
assumption) were rejected for reasons of cost and the decline in
local control over school expenditures and tax rate which might
result from their implementation. When fully implemented, this
GTB will represent a major step toward equalizing educational
opportunity. Its basic appeal to Connecticut lies in its maintenance
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of local control of schools. Furthermore, it does not take money
directly from one town to equalize expenditures in another town
(Anonymous 1975, 18).
As Thompson, Wood, and Crampton (2008, 85) note, “states favoring a
more local control perspective tended to devise plans that left considerable local
freedom to exceed a set of educational minimums”.

In other words,

municipalities who chose to expend funds in excess of the minimum would not
be penalized. So it was that the first school finance reform came in the form of an
equalization grant which rewards tax effort rather than property wealth. The
percent equalizing or district power equalizing grant as a school aid formula is a
conservative approach to reform insofar as it accepts as a given the property tax
as a legitimate method of financing public schools.

Each approach embodies

certain values such: equity, efficiency and liberty (Garms, Guthrie and Pierce,
1978). Efficiency-enhancing initiatives such as the guaranteed tax base has as its
main focus on the maintenance of local control of taxation and seeks to minimize
the shift of decision making power to the state.

The state guarantees that at a

given tax rate, a town will be able to raise a certain amount otherwise the state
makes up the difference.
The Guaranteed Tax Base Legislation of 1975: The First School Finance
Equalization Measure in Connecticut
The Commission presented the General Assembly with two options: 1)
equalize expenditures or 2) equalize tax capacity or tax raising power. The
Commission chose the latter because they believed it dealt more directly with the
problem to try to achieve tax neutrality among the citizens of the state in
providing for the educational needs of children. The bill utilizes the principle of
district power equalizing or guaranteed tax base. The first GTB program was
comprised of a formula that included: 1) wealth, 2) local tax effort, and 3) need. 11

Wealth was calculated as the difference between the town’s property wealth per
pupil and the property wealth per pupil that was at the 85th percentile in the state in per
pupil property wealth. Need was based on the total population of the town.
11
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Calculation of the GTB grant begins with the ranking of all towns based on their
ability to pay for school services from local tax sources. If the program were
fully funded, the GTB would guarantee each town the same amount of money
for each of its pupils as the 85th percentile town at any given tax rate.
Some legislators decried the fact that the final bill went beyond what the
commission recommended to the legislature in January.

Instead of the 75 th

percentile it used the 85th percentile and instead of using assessed valuation in
each community per pupil it uses per capita and a median family income factor.
Under this plan, 144 towns would receive aid and 25 towns would be held
harmless meaning that they will receive their basis aid under the Average Daily
Membership (ADM) but not receive additional money under the GTB. Each
town would be ranked in ascending order from poorest to richest. The goal
would be to raise the bottom 85 percent of towns to the 85 th percentile.
In what was the first of many revisions, the General Assembly capped the
equalization grants so that no school district would receive more than $12.50 per
pupil during the first year of implementation and then raised it to $18.25 during
the 1976 session. If fully funded the new program would have guaranteed each
town roughly the same amount of money as would be raised in the 85th
percentile town however, due to the cap, some observers in the State Department
of Education called the program “flat-grant add-on” rather than an equalization
program (Tracy, 30).
Summary of 1975 Legislative Debate and Final Vote on the Guaranteed Tax
Base
The debates regarding the first school finance reform legislation took
place during the 1975 spring session of the Connecticut General Assembly.
Among the participants in the debates were Joseph Lieberman, Christopher
Shays and Lawrence DeNardis, all of whom went on to careers in national
politics. After a rancorous debate in the House, the Senate debate began with
Senator Joseph Lieberman asking the Clerk to announce the bill so that members
would return to their seats in light of “such a significant issue.” Next, Senator
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Houley moved to adopt the Committee’s joint favorable report on House Bill
6310 heralding it as “a very historic first in the State of Connecticut as the bill
before us ends the era of the flat grant system of state assistance to local
educational costs and a small step forward that moves us toward the long-range
goal of equal educational opportunities.” She noted the many individuals who
have worked very long to place “before our consideration today the concept of a
guaranteed tax base and of equalization of the opportunity and the opportunity
for equal education” (Houley 1975, 2375).
The near unanimity of the passage of the bill does not tell the whole story.
One of the more controversial legislative proposals that generated heated
discussions was the so called “robinhood” approach.

The legislative proposal

which originated in the House, took money from some towns and gave to others
what is referred to formally as the recapture provision. Embedded in the school
finance reform debates are fundamental questions about equity, is the reform fair,
and if so fair to whom, redistribution necessarily implies winners and losers.
Most legislators found the idea unpalatable. One Senator stated that “we had
basic confidence in the basic fairness of our colleagues, and that in the end they
would not pit community against community and legislator against legislator, in
stealing from one town to give to another” (Gunther 1975, 2379). The
Appropriations and Education Committee revised the formula to omit the
provision after an outcry from legislators.
Finally, Bill 6310 was passed in the Senate by a vote of 34 in favor, 1
against and 1 abstention. While the ink was drying on the new legislation, the
state appealed the Superior Court’s decision to the State Supreme Court. The
1977 Supreme Court decision prompted the legislature to return to the drawing
board and empanel a second commission for the purpose of complying with the
court’s directive devise an equalization plan.
The statesmanlike debate in the Senate came only came after a rancorous
debate in the House. Among those who questioned the proposed formula to
262

Volume IV, Number 2

calculate

aid,

Representative

Christopher

Shays,

vigorously

questioned

committee members about the basis to derive a town’s property wealth. Shays
district encompassing among the wealthiest towns in Connecticut such as
Greenwich stood to loose out under this new plan. Despite the reservations of
some House members, the bill passed and went on to the Senate.
In introducing the Senate debate, co-chairs of the Commission, Senator
DeNardis, was asked to explain the specific details of the legislation.

He

recounted how the commission considered Connecticut’ system in light of cases
that were successfully brought in other states and we knew back in 1973 that it
would only be “a matter of time before Connecticut’s system would be subject to
a similar attack”. He went on to state that “Noting the wide variance in property
values and taxation, the flat grant does little to equalize that. The quality of a
child’s education should not depend on the wealth of his parents or neighbors
within the school district” (Lawrence DeNardis 1975, 2388).
However, a few Senators went on the record noting that while they voted
in favor out of deference and in recognition of the hard work of the Commission,
they had serious reservations about the legislation ranging from the equity of the
formula to the method of financing it through a state lottery. In fact, when the
bill was first introduced in the House in February it appeared to be doomed, due
to looming fiscal problems. After the legislation went through several iterations
and public input sessions, school finance reform was widely discussed around
Connecticut in public forums and news stories.
While the Commission’s work was well underway, Judge Jay Rubinow
issued his “Memorandum of Decision” in December 1974 declaring the use of the
local property tax to fund education as violating Sections I and 20 of Article First
of the Connecticut constitution of every child to receive an equal education with
all other children in the state. Meanwhile, the Commission continued to study
school finance in order to prepare legislative proposals that would fend off
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further litigation. The Meskill administration immediately appealed the Superior
Court’s decision.
The GTB and Municipal Overburden
Not surprisingly, there were several compromises that were struck to
secure passage of the 1975 GTB legislation. State Senator DeNardis expressed
mixed emotions about the resulting legislation:
It is extremely important to begin but unfortunate not to
have dealt with the closely-related problem of overall tax reform –
“twins of the same problem”. Some say the formula goes beyond
what the school finance problem involves – by using an income
factor and the population of the entire town as opposed to per
pupil assessed valuation and attempts to do more than equalize
school finance capacity (Larence DeNardis 1975, 2399).
The legislators vowed to work out inequities the next year. The General
Assembly doubled the GTB appropriation in 1976 providing additional per pupil
grants ranging from $20-100 dollars still well below what would be needed to
equalize spending disparities.
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Table 2

Office of Fiscal Analysis, State of Connecticut

Implementation of School Finance Reform in Connecticut
Connecticut represents an interesting anomaly in the area of school
finance reform. On one hand, it was an early adopter of reforms. In fact, the
legislature took pre-emptive action fashioning an equalization plan years before
the court rendered a decision in Horton (1977).

Yet, after thirty years of

equalization formulas, it has lagged behind other states in terms of the amount of
state funding provided to public schools.
School finance policy making in Connecticut is marked by both
similarities and differences from other states. It has encountered many of the
same stumbling blocks experienced elsewhere namely fiscal constraints and
recalcitrant legislatures. Beyond the usual problems, tackling school finance
reform in Connecticut has also been compounded by a set of factors that made
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reform even more difficult.

Systemic features such as the tax system in

Connecticut marked by the lack of a personal income tax for much of the time
period under study greatly constrained the parameters for policy choice.
Educational policy implementation in Connecticut with respect to school
finance reform has been particularly impacted by exogenous factors such as the
economy. It can best be characterized as incremental, contingent, and variable
depending in large part of the vicissitudes of economic cycles and in turn the
state’s budgetary situation and overall tax structure. Policies were adopted in
largely an incremental fashion punctuated by brief periods of policy intensity
while legislatures attempted to keep pace with court decisions. After adoption of
policy reforms, implementation efforts were eroded due to cyclical recessions
and other economic downturns that prompted fiscal retrenchment at the state
level.12 One of the first victims to fall prey to budgetary cuts was school aid.
A typical pattern in Connecticut’s school finance experience was the
following: policy reforms were adopted which were quickly reversed or
mitigated due to fiscal retrenchment owing in large part to economic recessions
that hit the Northeast during the late 1970s, early 1980s and early 1990s. Each of
these time periods dovetailed with critical junctures in school finance history
when key legislation was passed. In addition, to exogenous economic factors,
endogenous factors such as the structure of the tax system in Connecticut created
little leeway for new initiatives particularly those that were redistributive in
nature. A precarious tax structure that allowed little room for new expenditures
was made more precarious when economic downturns hit did in each decade
since the passage of the first GTB legislation in 1975. Such economic uncertainty
exacerbated the already deep ambivalence that many legislators had towards
school finance. All of these factors were the environment in which school finance
was implemented in Connecticut and undermined serious reforms efforts.
For a full discussion of the impact the economic recession of the 1970s on school
finance equity see Berne (1988), 159-180.
12
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Structure of Connecticut’s Tax System
The structure of Connecticut’s state finance system served in many
instances to constrain the parameters for action in the area of school finance.
Among the factors that hindered any new spending initiatives were the already
high sales tax, the lack of a personal income tax and one of the highest property
tax rates in the country (National Institute of Education 1981, 20). Although
Connecticut was the wealthiest state in per capita income, most of this personal
wealth would not be available to the public coffers owing to the fact that until
1991 the Constitution state was one of only a few states not to levy a broad based
income tax. The reliance on a general sales tax as well as gasoline and cigarette
taxes left Connecticut vulnerable to economic downturns. Educational reformers
had the herculean task of revising a new school finance system within the state’s
existing tax structure.
Reworking the GTB Formula: “Same Time Next Year”
A recurring theme in the ongoing school finance reform is the cyclical
nature of the policy making process. Beginning with the first GTB legislation,
dissatisfaction with the final legislation led some to promise that the formula
would be reworked during the next legislative session.
In his concluding remarks State Senator DeNardis stated his hope that
Depending on how the judges view this piece of legislation,
we may satisfy the plaintiffs in that case in whole or part, but at
least we are being responsible as a legislative body and not waiting
for the courts to dictate to us, to tell us what to do (Lawrence
DeNardis 1975, 2403).
Implicit in his remarks are the recognition that a first attempt to produce an
equalization plan, albeit imperfect, was preferable to the alternative, a court
ordered plan.

So began a thirty year quest to equalize school finances in

Connecticut. The original GTB legislation was undertaken with the agreement
that the plan would be phased in over a five-year period. This approach left the
reform vulnerable to subsequent legislative action. In fact, the legislation
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underwent no fewer than five amendments during the 1980’s which prompted
Wesley Horton to return to court.
Policy Options Post Horton I: “Opening Up Creativity”
In addressing a group of Connecticut legislators, John Coons (Professor at
the University of California School of Law) expressed his belief that the Horton
(1977) decision would open up creativity in the legislative process” (Coons 1978).
We won those cases on the principle that the legislature
would not be in any way impeded in using any decentralized
system, including the family, as the school district, so long as it did
not make the amount of public money for a child's education a
function of the wealth of the child's family or the school district. To
do that would be an irrational and unfair standard for a public
agency, in our view. We published a book in 1970 called Private
Wealth and Public Education, which expressed this constitutional
theory. We analyzed 14 or 15 state school systems and described
how they could be reoriented without either wrecking or
decreasing local control (Coons 2002).
The second commission fortunately did not have to reinvent the wheel as
it attempted to comply with the court’s order. The first GTB legislation passed in
May 1975 laid the groundwork for subsequent reform efforts and served as a
basic template to guide future reformers. As the legislature began its
deliberations in the wake of the Horton decision, the basic question which they
posed to one another was: what was the court looking for that would satisfy the
concerns raised by Horton v. Meskill? Perhaps factoring into their decision not to
prescribe a remedy, the Horton decision recognized and referenced the work of
the legislature and the GTB in the written decision. Ultimately, while the court
commended the legislature for its efforts, it deemed the GTB reform as
“miniscule”. Perhaps it should be noted that the GTB as a method itself was not
to blame but rather the insufficient funds appropriated by the legislature that led
the court make its declaration.
While the work of the first commission was an attempt to satisfy some yet
to be articulated legal standard and by so doing possibly fend off litigation
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through preemptive action, the post-Horton (I) reform efforts were done with the
knowledge that they were working under the full gaze of the court and the
public expectation that something substantial needed to be done to reform
Connecticut’s school finance system. Compliance became the watchword of the
second commission. Discerning what will pass muster with the courts is always
a difficult task made even more difficult by the fact it did not issue any
guidelines to the legislature beyond having to produce a constitutionally
acceptable school finance plan by May 1, 1979. There were, however, certain
policy parameters that the legislature knew it could not exceed in devising a plan.
Stated strenuously by Governor Ella Grasso, and echoing the oft repeated refrain
by a long line of Connecticut governors before her, she reiterated emphatically
that funding for any plan would not come through the adoption of a new
personal income tax. (Tracy, 1984, 75)
After the Connecticut State Supreme Court handed down its decision to
the legislature, key members of the House and Senate convened a second panel
for the purpose of studying and making recommendations regarding the options
for financing Connecticut’s schools.

The second such panel convened for this

purpose, it differed in a number of respects from the previous commission.
While the composition of the panel included many of the previous members
from the first commission, the second panel included a group that had been
largely silent partners, the Connecticut State Board of Education and the
Department of Education. While Education Department Commissioner Mark
Shedd was a member of the first panel and lauded the work of the panel
deeming its recommendations as being “sound” adopted a more vigorous
viewpoint on the second panel. On the heels of the Horton decision, the state
auditor’s office roundly criticized the Department of Education as lacking
leadership and failing to uphold the educational interests of the state (Tracy, 31).
Thus, the Department viewed the school finance reform issue as a vehicle to
shore up its public image and became a key player on the second commission
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and in crafting the remedy in the wake of the Horton decision. Additionally, the
commission was underwritten by a grant from HEW which would help generate
data and proposals and gave the Education Department significant influence
over the flow of finance reform options.
The Department of Education played a more prominent role in the
crafting of recommendations for the Second Commission. Prior to the mid-1970s,
state boards of education had been politically weak and marginal policy actors in
most states including Connecticut (Furman). With the property tax revolts in the
early 1970s and the perceived failures of public education in general, education
became a more highly salient political issue. The reform coalition that had begun
to take shape would place state education agencies in a more prominent position.
In Connecticut, Education Commissioner Shedd and the Department had
several goals for school finance reform. First among its priorities was to increase
the state share of the total cost of public education to 40% up from 27% in the
mid 1970s with 100 million dollars allocated for 1975-1976 (Tracy, 4).

To

accomplish such a funding goal, the Department believed a personal income
would have to be the source of revenue. The Department was also influential in
developing many of the details of the equalization formula including a minimum
expenditure require for local school districts and an income factor that would
accord more weight to school districts with disadvantaged students.
Post Horton I: Implementation of 1979 GTB Legislation
The revised GTB legislation was enacted on July 1, 1979. The law (P.A. 79128) called for a five year phase-in with 56% of the full costs of funding in FY 80,
67% in FY 81, 78% in FY 82, 89% in FY 83 and 100% of costs on full funding in FY
84 and thereafter. Douglas Reed points out that if fully funded “The formula
was in many ways, a state of the art financing plan that would have substantially
equalized the tax bases of Connecticut’s cities and towns.” In actuality, the
funding was less than 10% of the amount it would require to fully fund the
formula. Also during this time period rising school public expenditures also
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shrank the real dollar value of the funds to the point that they were actually
lower than 1975 levels.
Put differently, education historian Christopher Collier described the new
GTB plan as less effective and more cumbersome than the first GTB plan owing
to the sheer complexity of the formula. Factors used to distribute school under
the new modified GTB plan included a town’s wealth, tax effort and need
(Connecticut State Board of Education 1979). The calculation of the grant begins
with a ranking of all towns based on the ability to pay for school services from
local tax sources. Major differences between the first formula and the 1979
legislation were the inclusion of income wealth and the weighting of children
who received Aid to Families with Dependent Children or welfare.
Another major difference between the earlier GTB plan and the 1979
legislation was the Minimum Expenditure Requirement or MER. The legislation
set a minimum dollar figure that every district had to meet or exceed which
would obligate towns to commit a certain amount of new education aid to
schools designed to prevent towns from utilizing the funds for property tax relief.
As Collier (2008, 607) points out:
This Minimal Expenditure Requirement (MER) was to
provide no fewer dollars than the statewide median per-student
expenditure two years previous to the year in which it was granted.
In fact, however, by 1984 neither the GTB plan of 1975 nor the
schedule of 1979 had been fully funded, nor were they ever.
Compounding the problem was the financial disaster that hit Connecticut
during the late 1970s and 1980s with inflation rising as high as 13% which
dramatically impacted state revenues. It was in this climate that the legislature
passed 10 amendments to the 1979 GTB legislation to retrench the budget by
establishing caps on the amount each district could receive. (Reed 2001, 80).
In a policy analysis paper, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston noted that
“these restrictions which were legislatively imposed on the formula during the
phase-in period created a system that was difficult to understand and hard to
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administer” (Anonymous 1999).

Wesley Horton viewed the amendments as

undermining the gains he had worked so to hard to obtain on behalf of schools.
He entered a show-cause motion in Superior Court in 1978 to enjoin the state
from distributing state education aid under the existing GTB program and then
entered courtroom again in 1985 under Horton III (1985).
Horton III (1985)
Horton III (1985) challenged the GTB and the distribution formula adopted
by the General Assembly. In issuing it’s ruling, the Connecticut State Supreme
Court devised a three-step test to determine if the formula met the state’s
constitutional obligation.. In a novel approach to school finance reform, the
courts applied the legal reasoning used in the recent reapportionment case used
for legislative districting.

The Court imposed a more demanding burden of

proof that plaintiffs would have to meet in bringing adequacy claims against the
state (Reed 1996). During the mid to late 1980s, the legislature passed the
Educational Enhancement Act whose main thrust was to make grants to towns
for teacher salaries (Collier, 609) These decisions convinced Wesley Horton that
there were significant strides being made to equalize resources such that he
refrained from filing additional lawsuits against the state.
The Foundation Model and Education Cost Sharing
In response to Horton III there was a brief upward trend in funding. The
General Assembly passed a foundation model in 1988 which set a foundation
figure for each town and then contributes a sum on a sliding scale reflecting the
town’s tax base.13 The Education Cost Sharing formula components consist of
foundation, resident students, poverty weighting, mastery weighting, town
wealth, SGWL (State Guaranteed Wealth Level), capping/phase-in, and hold
harmless/minimum aid. The last time the ECS formula was changed was 1995.

An example cited in Collier (2008) illustrates the point: if the foundation figure
was $5,981 in 2007, Greenwich might get $2,000 from the state and have to raise $3,891,
itself.
13
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The key difference between ECS and GTB is blended wealth. The GTB
considered property wealth per capita and used a per capita income measure
include to adjust each town’s Equalized Net Grand List or ENGL. ECS in 19951996 expanded the definition of town wealth to factor in property wealth on both
a per student and per capita basis and adjust for income using both per capital
income and median household income. The averaging of these four measures
gives towns with different demographics the potential benefit that might be
missed if only a single measure were used.
After hitting a high water mark in 1990 with 44.7% of school funds
providing by the state, Connecticut experienced another recession in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Due to economic expediency, towns were allowed to
forego the minimum expenditure requirement.. Since the inception of the ECS
grant in 1989 until today, the grant program would be routinely underfunded by
the Connecticut General Assembly through capping provisions.

As the

Connecticut Conference of Municipalities noted in a recent report, the net effect
of such caps would mean that “one in four municipalities still receive less per
pupil in ECS aid then under the $250 per pupil flat-grant funding system that
was determined to be unconstitutional in 1977.”14
Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding v. Rell
The chronic underfunding of school aid formulas through ECS capping
provisions prompted a public advocacy group to file a lawsuit against the
administration of Governor Rell. Wesley Horton had long since left the
unfinished business from Horton v. Meskill to become part of the legal litigating
Sheff v. O’Neill lawsuits dealing with the racial segregation of Hartford’s schools.
No longer the standard bearer of the movement, other public advocacy groups
had stepped into the breach to carry the movement forward. One such group,
under the auspices of Yale University Law School was the Connecticut Coalition
For a full discussion of the ECS cap, see Connecticut Conference of
Municipalities (2009).
14
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for Justice in Education Funding [CCJEF]. This organization filed a lawsuit
against the Rell administration in the spring of 2005. The lawsuit alleges that
“the state’s failure to suitably and equitably fund its public schools has
irreparably harmed thousands of Connecticut schoolchildren” (295 Conn. 240
(2008), overview at http://ccjef,org/overview .htm). In partial response to the
litigation, Governor Rell empanelled a Commission on Education Finance, the 7 th
commission since the inception of the first equalization plan.
The Seventh and Final Commission on School Finance?
The Seventh Commission to Study School Finance in Connecticut was
empanelled by Governor Rell in January of 2006 and issued its final
recommendations in January of 2007. The gubernatorial commission was divided
into three subcommittees: ECS, accountability, and other education grants. Not
surprisingly, the ECS subcommittee concluded that the state is spending
significant less than what the originally proposed formula would have funded
education (Connecticut Commission on Education Finance 2006).
Based on the subcommittee’s recommendation and with a budget surplus
working in her favor, Governor Rell proposed an unprecedented increased in
funds for ECS.

Ultimately, the Democratically-controlled General Assembly

chose to fund other spending priorities. 15 Meanwhile, CCJEF v. Rell is still
working its way through the Connecticut Supreme Court. The outcome of the
lawsuit will determine whether Horton will continue his odyssey.
Conclusions
School finance reform has been marked by many of the same pitfalls that
other states have encountered in the design and implementation of school aid
formulas. However, as argued in this paper, Connecticut’s difficulties have been
more pronounced due to a confluence of political and financial factors that have
exacerbated a difficult situation.
The Connecticut Conference of Municipalities noted that the legislature allocated
around $200 million of the 1 billion budget proposal submitted by Governor Rell.
15
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The lion’s share of the policy failure rests with the Connecticut General
Assembly. As the body prompted by court decisions to design an equalization
plan, much of the responsibility can be squarely placed at the legislature’s
doorstep. While the design of the equalization plans differed depending on
whether Democrats or Republicans controlled the General Assembly, what did
not differ greatly was the tendency through the time period under review was a
notable reluctance e to fully fund equalization schemes. Both political parties
seemed to be equally concerned with cost containment yielding to important
political realities. Gubernatorial inaction, legislative recalcitrance and looming
financial and fiscal realities all conspired to doom school finance reform in
Connecticut.
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